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PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
DAVID J. CANNON*
In the investigation of a bank robbery, the prosecuting attorney
has talked to a number of bank tellers and to customers who have
viewed the defendant in a line-up and who have stated, "He's the man!"
The prosecutor has also talked to two other customers who observed
the robbery, viewed the defendant and stated that they had not seen the
defendant on the night in question. Must the prosecutor tell the defend-
ant about this evidence? The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has said, in United States v. Wilkins,' that failure to do
so is a denial of due process.
The United States Supreme Court, in Brady v. Maryland,2 has ruled
that:
[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to the guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith, or bad faith of the prosecution.3
The rule formulated in Brady has caused and will continue to cause
great concern among judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys even
though most people are in full agreement with the principle of law for
which it stands. The difficulties of the rule's application in an adversary
system have been myriad. Among the questions raised by the Brady
decision are the following: Must there be a demand? What is "evi-
dence" for purposes of the Brady rule? What constitutes suppression?
What evidence is favorable to the accused and who makes the determin-
ation? When must the evidence be revealed to the defendant? The pur-
pose of this article is to point out some of the diverse views on these
questions.
In recent years, discovery procedures in civil cases have been greatly
expanded. Many legal scholars feel that the expanded availability of
discovery is one of the most effective means of decreasing the backlog
of cases which overburden the courts, particularly in metropolitan areas.
If the old adage, "justice delayed is justice denied," has any merit, it
is imperative that any method which might alleviate the delay is worthy
of consideration by the legal profession.
No right to pre-trial discovery in criminal cases existed until the
rather recent past.4 However, the modern trend has been toward greater
*United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Assistance in
the preparation of the appendix was given the author by second-year law stu-
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1326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3 Id. at 87.
4 23 C.J.S. Criininal Law § 955 (1961).
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ease of discovery and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reflect
the trend.5 It should be pointed out, however, that rules for discovery in
criminal cases are fraught with constitutional problems in that no rule
may infringe on the right against self-incrimination. Mr. Justice Doug-
las pointed this out in his statement accompanying the transmittal of
the Federal Rules to Congress.6
The Second Circuit, in Wilkins, extended the Brady rule and held
that a request by the defendant is not a sine qua non to establish a
duty to disclose on the prosecutor's part. The court's holding is a logi-
cal extention of Brady and seems clearly consistent with Brady's under-
lying philosophy. Due process cannot depend upon the request of the
defendant. The extension of the rule, however, does place an added
burden upon the prosecutor since he must, even in the absence of a re-
quest, decide what evidence should be disclosed. It would appear that
materiality and relevance of some cases would be dependent upon the
theory of the defense which would be unknown to the prosecutor.
Who determines what evidence is favorable? The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Dutton7 held that the trial court in
camera should have inspected the demanded evidence to determine
whether it was favorable to the defendant. The court pointed out that
the right of the accused to have such evidence cannot depend on the
benevolence of the prosecutor." The court cautioned, however, that un-
limited discovery of the prosecutor's files would unduly impair effective
prosecution of criminal cases." This case illustrates the importance of
making a demand for evidence. Without the demand, the court has
nothing to inspect unless it looks at the entire files of the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v.
Jordan0 also held that the determination of what evidence is favorable
to the defendant is one for the trial court subject to appellate review.
The need to make a proper record of the discovery proceedings is clear;
lacking it, the appellate court has nothing to review.
Contrasted with the decisions in Dutton and Jordan is the holding
of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Frazier."'
The obligation upon the Government not to suppress favorable
evidence . . . and affirmatively to disclose . . . does not make it
5 See, e.g., the text of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
the appendix to this article at page 529, infra.
6 39 F.R.D. 276 (1966).
7 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968).
8 Id. at 800.
0 1d. at 801.
10 399 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1968).
"1394 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1968).
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incumbent upon the trial judge to rummage through the file on
behalf of the defendant.' 2
In Frazier, the United States Attorney advised the court that the de-
fendant was aware of virtually everything in the government's file and
also that there was no information which could be of aid to the de-
fendant.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court appears to have answered the ques-
tion in yet another manner in State v. Herrington.13 Herrington's de-
fense counsel requested the state to turn over all exculpatory evidence
bearing on the issues of guilt or punishment. The trial court, as in
Frazier, turned to the prosecutor. The court ordered that all exculpatory
evidence be turned over to the defense. The prosecutor claimed that
all such evidence had been made available to the defendant. On appeal,
the defendant asserted that the trial court should have examined all files
of the prosecutor and police department to see if its order had been
complied with. The court replied:
From an examination of the record, we conclude that the trial
court was fully cognizant of the holding in Brady v. Alraryland
and exercised considerable diligence in its proper application. 14
It is self-evident that this ruling is dependent upon the good faith
of the prosecutor. There was nothing in the record for the appellate
court to review. It would appear from Jordan and Dutton that the
Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, if confronted with the same fact
situation, would hold differently.
The cases above point out the dilemma the practitioner encounters
as he faces each case. Nowhere is the distinction in legal philosophies
more apparent than in the opinions of Mr. Justice Fortas and Mr.
Justice Harlan in the case of Giles v. Maryland.15 The defendants in
Giles were convicted of the rape of a sixteen-year-old girl and they
alleged that the failure of the state to disclose the past history of the
prosecutrix to the defendants denied them due process of law.
Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, enunciated his philoso-
phy in the following terms:
I believe that deliberate concealment and non-disclosure by the
State are not to be distinguished in principle from misrepresenta-
tion.G
In my view, a supportable conviction requires something more
than that the State did not lie. It implies that the prosecution has
been fair and honest and that the State has disclosed all informa-
"Id. at 262.
1341 Wis. 2d 757, 165 N.W.2d 120 (1969).
"4 Id. at 774, 165 N.W.2d at 128.




tion known to it which may have a crucial or important effect
on the outcome.1
7
The philosophy of Mr. Justice Harlan is well stated in his dissent:
The Court has held since Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
that a State's knowing use of perjured testimony denies a fair
trial to the accused. Mooney has been understood to include
cases in which a State knowingly permits false testimony to re-
main uncorrected. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28; Napue v. Illi-
nois, 360 U.S. 264. The standard applied in such cases has been
whether the testimony "may have had an effect on the outcome
of the trial." Napue v. Illinois, supra, at 272. These cases were
very recently followed and applied in Miller v. Pate, [386 U.S.
1 (1967)]. Apart from dicta in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, the Court has never gone further. Nor in my view, does the
Constitution demand more.' 8
Mr. justice White in his separate opinion in the Brady case points out
that the due process discussion by the Court in Brady was wholly ad-
visory.'s
Judge Learned Hand expressed what has been called a prosecutor's
view"0 of discovery in United States v. Garsson:
21
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not
disclose the various outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence. He cannot be convicted
where there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the
twelve. Why, in addition, he should in advance have the whole
evidence against him to kick over at his leisure and to make
his defense fairly or foully, I have never been able to see ....
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused.
Our procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of the in-
nocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to
fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that ob-
structs, delays and defeats the prosecution of crime.22
But see the statement of Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Williams v. United
States:
23
The sporting theory of justice is no longer appropriate in crimi-
nal cases; the stakes are far too high, and the sides too un-
equal. Particularly in the case of an indigent defendant repre-
17 Id. at 101 (concurring opinion).
Is Id. at 116-17 (dissenting opinion).
19 373 U.S. at 91.2 0 Remark by Judge Edward C. McLeon of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York at a panel discussion on "Discovery in
Criminal Cases," before the Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Cir-
cuit, September 8, 1967, as reported in 44 F.R.D. 481, at 486.
21291 F. 646 (S.D. N.Y. 1923).
22 Id. at 649.
23 393 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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sented by Court-appointed counsel, the government's resources
are overwhelmingly superior."
These opinions reflect clear ideological differences. As Mr. Justice
Brennan has pointed out, the issue of pre-trial discovery in criminal
cases raises this clash of ideologies.2 5 It is not surprising that the de-
bate over discovery has been marked with some bitterness.
Mindful of the risk that this article might be used against me in
future cases, I will nonetheless endeavor to set forth my own personal
answers to the questions raised at the beginning of the article and to
recommend the procedure defense attorneys should follow.
There is no legal requirement that a demand for the evidence be
made; however, it is easier for the prosecutor when one is made. In
busy metropolitan areas, prosecutors have little more than cursory
preparation for the average case. Often the prosecutors are not aware
of what the various case files contain. Defense attorneys should make
their demands as specific as possible and should follow the specific
request with a general request. This procedure will protect the record
as well as defense counsel's reputation.
All exculpatory evidence, whether physical, oral or of whatever
type, should be disclosed if the rule is to have any meaning. A distinc-
tion in this area would emasculate the rule.
To suppress is to refrain from divulging or to leave undisclosed.
This would appear to fthean that the prosecutor must disclose all he
knows which is favorable to the defendant. A logical extension would
hold him just as responsible if such information were in the hands of
another prosecutor in the office or in the police files. Justice cannot be
dependent upon who has the information. These interpretations, how-
ever, do not apply to cumulative evidence or evidence obviously within
the knowledge of the defendant. Such evidence is not undisclosed and
in no way deprives the defendant of a fair trial.
Whether or not evidence is favorable to an accused will often de-
pend on the type of defense asserted. Candor by the defense attorney
in conferences with prosecutors and courts will in most cases result
in more evidence being disclosed. Those cases where the prosecutor
feels that the defendant is setting traps most often result in the hard-
line positions of prosecutors.
Who makes the determination of what is favorable to the defendant?
In my opinion, the determination should be made by the prosecutor.
To hold otherwise, it seems, would place an impossible administrative
burden on the court and also would in soime cases expose the court
to information which would or could prejudice the court against the
24 1d. at 963.
25Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279.
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defendant. This method, however, is completely unsatisfactory if there
is an allegation that the prosecutor is deliberately withholding favorable
material. In such a situation, the evidence should be studied by a third
party, either a judge or special master of some sort appointed by the
court. This would protect the record of the trial, prevent law enforce-
ment officials from being unjustly accused and also protect defendants
who might be unduly harassed by the rare bad-faith prosecutor.
APPENDIX
As the principal article states, Brady v. Maryland has raised
many questions in the area of criminal discovery. What follows
is a listing of decisions, articles and annotations which may help
to clarify the impact of the Brady decision.
CASES
Must the defendant make a demand.
The Brady decision was not directly concerned with the necessity
of a demand and the rule that seems to come out of Brady is that
"the suppression by prosecution, upon request, violates due proc-
ess." The impression is left that the defendant must make a request.
Rule 16(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a motion under the rule must be made within 10 days after
arraignment or at such reasonable later time as the court may
permit.
In addition to the decisions discussed in the principal article,
the following cases discuss the necessity of a demand:
Fed.-Barbie v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (Failure of
defendant's attorney to ask for results of police department bal-
listics and fingerprint tests did not excuse prosecutor's failure to
inform defendant of such reports.)
Ariz.--State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 422 P.2d 125 (1967) (Not
necessary that defendant request prosecution to disclose knife found at
scene of crime.)
Cal.-People v. Crovedi, 49 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(The defendant's right to discover evidence in the possession of
the prosecution must be timely asserted by a proper motion for
an order of discovery and reasonably pursued; otherwise, it will
be deemed waived.)
Fla.-Drozewski v. State, 84 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1955) (Prior to trial,
the defendant requested a list of all witnesses and the court granted
the request. However, the defendant subsequently failed to follow
this up with another request for the information from the state's
attorney and the court held that it was proper for the state to
introduce the evidence at trial.)
II1.-People v. Hoffman, 32 Ill. 2d 96, 203 N.E.2d 873 (1965) (In
a murder trial, the fact that the defendant's counsel knew of a
1969-70]
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report concerning a certain piece of clothing about 3 weeks before
trial, but made no request until the trial was in progress, did not
render the request untimely. This was so because there was no
indication that the production of the clothing would have delayed
trial.)
Iowa-State v. Bittner, 209 Iowa 109, 227 N.W. 601 (1929) (In
a murder trial, the refusal of the court to compel state to produce
the written confession of an accomplice was not erroneous, in ab-
sence of a request for a subpoena duces tecum or adoption of any
other means to effectuate the request therefor.)
Mo.-State v. Malone, 301 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1957) (In a murder
prosecution, the court upheld the trial court's overruling of the
defendant's oral request for the privilege of inspecting any articles
taken from the body of the deceased on the ground that the request
was untimely.)
Ohio-State v. Hill, 191 N.E.2d 235 (C.P. Ohio 1963) (The court
held that a seasonable request before trial must be made; the cir-
cumstances of each case will govern.)
What is "evidence" for purposes of the Brady Rule.
The Brady decision did not discuss the problem of what evidence
is subject to discovery. Many post-Brady decisions have been faced
with this issue.
A. Is the defendant entitled to the work product of the prosecut-
ing attorney? Most courts have said "no":
Fed.-Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(Where the government attorney has made only a substantial ver-
batim record of an interview, his notes are not immune from dis-
covery, but where he has recorded his own thoughts such notes
will fall within the work-product immunity.)
Ariz.-State ex rel. Corbin v. Superior Court, 99 Ariz. 382, 409
P.2d 547 (1966) (Reports compiled by law enforcement authorities
in the course of their investigations constitute "work product" of
the state and, as such, are privileged from pre-trial discovery.)
Ark.-Edens v. State, 235 Ark. 130, 359 S.W.2d 432 (1962) (The
defendant was not entitled to copies of statements which the prose-
cuting attorney had obtained from state witnesses because they
were part of the prosecuting attorney's work product.)
Colo.-Happer v. People, 152 Colo. 405, 382 P.2d 540 (1963) (Work
sheets of the district attorney made in preparation for trial did
not come within the coverage of the criminal procedure rule pro-
viding for production of statements of witnesses in possession of
the prosecution after direct examination.)
Fla.-State v. McCall, 186 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1966) (The statute pro-
viding for inspection of certain items cannot be applied when the
material is clearly the work product of the prosecuting attorney.)
N.H.-State v. Healy, 106 N.H. 308, 210 A.2d 695 (1965) (Work
product is immune from discovery; however, the court held that hos-
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pital records made during the defendant's commitment were not
part of the work product of the prosecuting attorney.)
N.J.-State v.Tune, 24 N.J. Super. 428, 94 A.2d 695 (1953) (Only
in the most exceptional case and under the most unusual circum-
stances does a defendant have a right to discovery of the work
product of the prosecutor.)
B. Must statements and documents be made available to the de-
fendant prior to trial?
Fed.-Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1952) (Where there
is not specific legislation, the question of whether a document
would be ordered to be produced for inspection is governed by
the principles of common law as interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.) ; Augenblick
v. United States, 377 F.2d 586 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (Justice requires that
the defendant at a criminal trial obtain prior statements of a wit-
ness which relate to his testimony.) ; United States v. Gleason, 265
F. Supp. 880 (S.D. N.Y. 1967) (There is no general requirement
that a prosecutor deliver or report to a defendant statements of
co-defendants that the defense would or might find helpful.) ; United
States v. Louis Carreau, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 408 (S.D. N.Y. 1967) (Rule
16(b) permits the court to authorize disclosure of a defendant's
statement, but the defendant is not relieved of an obligation to
show good cause.)
Ariz.-State ex rel. Helm v. Superior Court, 90 Ariz. 133, 367 P.2d
6 (1961) (The court has an inherent power to order the production
and inspection of certain papers, documents and articles when they
are essential to the administration of justice; the defendant was
given the results of blood alcohol test.)
Ark.-Stout v. State, 244 Ark. 676, 426 S.W.2d 800 (1968) (The
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the refusal, in a homicide
prosecution, to require, on the defendant's motion, that the prose-
cuting attorney produce the defendant's written statement, made
shortly after the defendant shot the deceased, for determining
whether any inconsistency existed between such statements and
the defendant's testimony, as the prosecutor claimed, was reversible
error.)
Cal.--People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 338 P.2d 428 (1959) (A
defendant in a criminal case can, on proper showing, compel the
production of documents in possession of the People which are
relevant and material to the case; involved here was a prior state-
ment of a prosecution witness.)
Colo.-Ortega v. People, 426 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1967) (Witnesses'
statements in possession of police are within the rule which re-
quires the prosecution to produce for the defendant any statement
of a witness in possession of prosecuting attorney or under his
control which relates to the subject matter to which the witness
has testified; the rule includes notes by police which are substanti-
ally verbatim.)
Conn.-State v. Pikul, 150 Conn. 195, 187 A.2d 442 (1962) (It is
within the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a defendant
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the right to inspect prosecution witnesses' statements in posses-
sion of the state's attorney.)
Del.-State v. Hutchins, 1 Storey 100, 51 Del. 100, 138 A.2d 342
(1957) (A pre-trial disclosure for impeachment purposes should not
be directed.)
Fla.-Scott v. State, 207 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1968) (The defense coun-
sel was not entitled to the production of police reports containing
statements of one of the state's witnesses.)
III.-People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957) (Where
defense counsel has reason to believe that statements of the state's
witness made to police officers on the day of the robbery in ques-
tion are in the prosecution's possession, the defense is entitled to
subpoena such records.)
Ind.-Nuckles v. State, 236 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. 1968) (The denial
of the defendant's request to take depositions of specified police
officers who had interrogated the defendant, taking his oral con-
fession, was error, there being no showing by the state of a para-
mount interest in nondisclosure of the confession.)
La.-State v. Bikham, 239 La. 1094, 121 So. 2d 207 (1960) (The
defendant in a murder case was entitled to inspect his written
confession, but not copies of his oral statements.)
Mass.-Commonwealth v. Chaplin, 333 Mass. 610, 132 N.E.2d 404
(1956) (The defendant in murder case is not allowed to inspect a
copy of his confession.)
Minn.-State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 141 N.W.2d 815 (1966)
(The court held reports by officers, and certain mechanical, steno-
graphic and electronic recordings, may come under the rule that
pre-trial statements of witnesses called by prosecution must be pro-
duced for examination by the defendant.)
Mo.-State v. Cody, 379 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1964) (The defendant
was not entitled to proceed under a statute respecting production
of documents, where he made no showing of good cause; see Mo.
REv. STAT. §510.030 (1959).); State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807
(Mo. 1964) (No general right of discovery by statute or rule in
Missouri in criminal cases; however, the courts have generally
held that defense counsel should be permitted to inspect any report
or paper to which a witness has referred or used on the stand to
refresh his recollection. There should be a showing of probability
of materiality of the paper.)
Neb.-State y. Williams, 183 Neb. 257, 159 N.W.2d 549 (1968)
(Defense counsel has no right to inspect or compel production of
evidence in possession of the state; the trial court is invested with
broad judicial discretion regarding the requiring of the production
of written confessions, statements or other documentary evidence
for inspection of defense counsel before trial.)
N.Y.-State v. Rosario, 9 N.Y. 2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.
2d 448 (1961) (Defense counsel should have been permitted to
examine the prior statements of prosecution witnesses in their
entirety for the purpose of cross-examination.)
Okla.-State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim.
1957) ("In the interest of justice, for good cause shown, where the
denial of pre-trial inspection of a report in the possession of the
[Vol. 52
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prosecution might result in a miscarriage of justice, the trial court
has the inherent right in the exercise of sound judicial discretion
to grant the remedy of pre-trial inspection of a report in the prose-
cution's possession where the primary source is no longer in ex-
istence and the report constitutes the only available source of
evidentiary inspection.'"--FBI analysis of paint scrapings involved.)
Wis.-State v. Richards, 21 Wis. 2d 622, 124 N.W.2d 684 (1963)
(Defendants were convicted in circuit court of robbery and they
appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court com-
mitted prejudicial error in denying to them the production of prior
statements allegedly made to police officers by one of the prosecu-
tion's witnesses. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant in a criminal case is entitled to inspect statements previ-
ously made to the authorities by witnesses called to testify on
behalf of the state. The court extended the right only to statements
concerning the subject matter of the witnesses' testimony and written
or signed by the witnesses or given orally and stenographically
or mechanically transcribed. The court did not require that the in-
spection be afforded before the witnesses testify.)
C. There have been several decisions regarding the availability of
records in possession of the prosecution:
Fed.-United States v. Avella, 395 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1968) (The
court held that under Brady a defendant is not authorized to ob-
tain a complete discovery of whatever records the government may
have without any indication that they contain anything favorable
to his case.)
Colo.-Mendelsohn v. People, 143 Colo. 397, 353 P.2d 587 (1960)
(A defendant's right to inspection is non-existent without the
proper statute; thus, it was not error to deny the defendant's mo-
tion to return his company's books prior to trial.)
Neb.-Hameyer v. State, 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458 (1947) (By
rule of procedure in criminal cases, the court, in exercise of its
sound discretion, should, where the prosecution is based upon the
correctness or incorrectness of certain records or documents, allow
an inspection of such records and documents upon request of the
defendant; a lease was the document in question.)
N.H.-State v. Healey, 106 N.H. 308, 210 A.2d 486 (1965) (The
defendant could, in the discretion of the trial court, be afforded the
right of pre-trial inspection of records made by doctors or a hos-
pital during the time the defendant was committed for observation
or because of his mental condition.)
N.J.-Statev. Boutsikaris, 69 N.J. Super. 601, 174 A.2d 653 (1961)
(The defendant was entitled to inspect, before trial, an employer's
records pertaining to an employee, who was a necessary witness
against the defendant, to determine the existence of a report of a
psychiatric evaluation of the employee.)
Wis.-State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967)
(Although complaining witness admitted on cross-examination
that she had previously falsely accused other men of having sexual
intercourse with her, in view of the fact that defense counsel was
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permitted wide latitude in his cross-examination of the witness and
the fact that there was no indication the witness had ever denied
her accusations against the defendant, refusal to require the state
to turn over to the defendant whatever records it may have had
concerning the mental condition of the witness was not improper;
the case also held that Wisconsin does not recognize a right to pre-
trial discovery in criminal cases.)
D. A few recent decisions involve the discoverability of evidence
other than statements, records, and other documents:
Fed.-United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1967) (A tape
recording made by a prosecution witness of a conversation between
her, her attorney, and the defendant was held producible under
Rule 16(a) (1), in the discretion of the trial judge.)
Iowa-State v. White, 151 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1965) (The defend-
ant was entitled to have an examination of tape recordings of an
officer's radio calls and conversation to determine whether they
contained information material to his defense that he had been
entrapped by an informant working with the police.)
N.H.-State v. Superior Court, 106 N.H. 228, 208 A.2d 832 (1965)
(The Supreme Court held that although there existed no right to
pre-trial inspection in criminal cases, the trial court, "[I]n the
exercise of reasonable discretion and to prevent injustice had power
to require the production of specific objects or writings for in-
spection under appropriate safeguards and at a time appropriately
close to the time of trial, if it should appear that otherwise essen-
tial rights of the respondents may be endangered or the trial un-
necessarily prolonged." The court here allowed the inspection of
guns, bullets, clothing, hair, a knife, an automobile, and vacuum
sweepings.)
N.J.-State v. Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 175 A.2d 622 (1961) (A rule
relating to pre-trial inspection is not limited to evidence the state
intends to use in prosecution; it contemplates pre-trial inspection
as a matter of right of everything taken from the defendant other
than his statement.)
Wash.-State v. Green, 70 Wash. 2d 955, 425 P.2d 913 (1967)
(Whether a defendant is entitled to pre-trial inspection of evidence
lies within the discretion of the trial court-a discretion that will
not be disturbed unless there was a manifest abuse of that discre-
tion; in this case, the court denied the defendant's request, one
week before trial, for all statements, confessions, and physical
evidence.)
E. The accused is not usually entitled to inspect the report of an
investigating body, such as a grand jury, but inspection has been
allowed where refusal might result in a miscarriage of justice:
Fed.-United States v. Bitter, 374 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1967) (The
defense has the burden of showing particularized need for inspec-
tion of grand jury minutes; the case was reversed, apparently on
other grounds, in 389 U.S. 15 (1967).)
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Ariz.-State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, 95 Ariz. 319, 390 P.2d
109 (1964) (There are only three circumstances which justify the
trial court in ordering disclosure of testimony given before a grand
jury: (1) after the witness has testified at trial, to determine
whether the testimony is consistent with that given before the
grand jury; (2) where the witness is charged with perjury; and,
(3) when permitted by the court in furtherance of justice.)
I11.-People v. Lighting, 83 Ill. App. 2d 430, 228 N.E.2d 104 (1967)
(The defendant's pre-trial motion requesting the disclosure of the
grand jury minutes was held to have been properly denied.)
N.M.-State v. Tackett, 78 N.M. 450, 432 P.2d 415 (1967) (A
transcript of testimony of witnesses before a grand jury need not
be supplied to the defendant in the absence of a showing of par-
ticularized need.)
Wis.-State ex rel. Johnson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 118 N.W.
2d 939 (1963) (The Supreme Court quoted a previous decision
which concerned grand jury testimony and stated that the same
reasons apply for denying John Doe testimony. "[T]here exists
the very practical reason, especially applicable to the situation
where the jury is continuing to sit, that an inspection of the min-
utes, if permitted to any defendant for the purpose of preparing
his defense, would advise the public of the subject under investiga-
tion, afford an opportunity to those interested in thwarting an
inquiry into their acts of secreting evidence, tampering with pros-
pective testimony, and generally embarrassing the work to be done
by the grand jury, if not entirely defeating the object for which
that body is designed." See Wis. STAT. §954.025 (1967).)
What is "suppression?"
Suppression by the prosecution of material evidence exculpatory
to the accused is a violation of due process. It is not yet clear,
however, what acts or omissions by the prosecuting attorney will
be characterized as suppression. The following cases may be helpful:
Fed.-Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968) (Suppres-
sion by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused vio-
lates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, and irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prose-
cution; the prosecution, in addition, has the affirmative duty to
produce, at the appropriate time, the requested evidence which is
materially favorable to the accused, either as direct or impeaching
evidence.); Ashely v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963) (The
failure of the distridt attorney to disclose to the defendant the
opinions of both a state psychiatrist and a psychologist that the
defendants were legally incompetent amounted to a denial of due
process.); Woollomes v. Heinze, 198 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1952) (Af-
fivdavits by alleged eyewitnesses, which revealed that they had
never been questioned by the police and that they had never dis-
closed what they knew to the defense counsel, was at most newly-
discovered evidence and the prisoner was not entitled to a writ of




Cal.-People v. Mort, 214 Cal. App. 2d 596, 29 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1963)
(Whether the failure of the district attorney to call a particular wit-
ness constitutes suppression of evidence necessarily depends on
the state of the evidence in a case, measured against facts to which
an uncalled witness could testify.)
N.Y.-People v. Whitmore, 45 Misc. 2d 506, 247 N.Y.S.2d 787
(1965) (Though it was not unreasonable for the prosecution to
believe that an FBI report might be inadmissible, the question of
admissibility should have been left to the court, and failure to do
so did not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to reveal the
report to the defense for whatever usable purpose the defense might
think proper.)
ARTICLES
Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L. J.
1276 (1966). The author discusses the 1966 amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. His emphasis is on Rule 16, which
he feels is the most important amendment. Mr. Reznick states that the
defendant is given the opportunity to obtain broader discovery if he
makes certain disclosures about his case to the government.
Wexler, The Constitutional Disclosure Duty and the Jencks Act, 40
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 206 (1965). The article discusses the possible
effect that United States Supreme Court decisions like Brady v. Mary-
land could have on discovery rights of defendants as established by
the Jencks Act. Mr. Wexler seems to feel that the constitutional prin-
ciples set forth in Brady should not be broadly extended to the im-
peachment discovery rules promulgated by the Jencks Act.
Daggett, Doctrine of Discovery in Criminal Law Procedure, 43 N. DAK.
L. REV. 333 (1966). The author discusses the recent trend in many
states and in the federal courts toward expanded rights of discovery
for defendants in criminal cases. He also discusses the problems aris-
ing under the present and proposed discovery procedures, especially
those problems arising from disclosure at the discretion of the trial
judge. The article contains strong arguments in support of the liberal
trend.
Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence
to the Defendant, 74 YALE L. J. 136 (1964). This comment contains
a detailed discussion of the recent series of 14th Amendment cases
involving the suppression of evidence by the prosecutor. The author
would require the prosecutor to reveal all relevant evidence, not only
the evidence that he thinks may be useful for defense purposes. "The
prosecutor's job is to present the state's case, not to determine what
theories his opponents can use." The author believes that to require
the judge to determine what evidence should be disclosed would over-
burden the courts.
Comment, The Need for Liberalized Rules of Discovery in Criminal
Procedure, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 736 (1966). The author analyzes dis-
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covery practices, both federal and in Wisconsin, up to the date of the
article. He also summarizes the arguments for and against liberalized
criminal discovery.
Wisconsin Criminal Procedure, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 430. This article
presents a very detailed discussion of the discovery mechanism available
in Wisconsin and, in fact, details the criminal procedure from the time
the defendant meets the attorney until he is paroled. The discovery por-
tion of the article provides a guide to what should be done to gain and
protect the defendant's rights under Wisconsin's strict view of dis-
covery. The relevant state statutes are discussed.
ANNOTATIONS
Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1954) ("Suppression of Evidence by Prose-
cution in Criminal Cases as Vitiating Conviction").
Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 819 (1966) ("Discovery and Inspection of Prose-
cution's Evidence Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16").
Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 8 (1966) ("Right of Accused in State Courts to
Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence in Possession of Prosecution").
Annot., 33 F.R.D. 47 (1964) ("Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases").
RULE 16
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION (a) Defendant's Statements; Reports
of Examinations and Tests; Defendant's Grand Jury Testimony. Upon
motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the govern-
ment to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any
relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by
the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or con-
trol of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the ex-
ercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the gov-
ernment, (2) results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and
of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular
case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the
government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due
diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government, and
(3) recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.
(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Objects or Places.
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the
government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies
or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control
of the government, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of
his defense, and that the request is reasonable. Except as provided in
subdivision (a) (2), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspec-
tion of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents
made by government agents in connection with th investigation or
prosecution of the case, or of statements made by government witnesses
or prospective government witnesses (other than the defendant) to
agents of the government except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
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(c) Discovery by the Government. If the court grants relief sought
by the defendant under subdivision (a) (2) or subdivision (b) of this
rule, it may, upon motion of the government, condition its order by re-
quiring that the defendant permit the government to inspect and copy
or photograph scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents,
tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which the defendant in-
tends to produce at the trial and which are within his possession, cus-
tody or control, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the
government's case and that the request is reasonable. Except as to scien-
tific or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the discovery
or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense docu-
ments made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents in connection
with the investigation or defense of the case, or statements made by the
defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective
government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents or attor-
neys.
(d) Time, Place and Manner of Discovery and Inspection. An order
of the court granting relief under this rule shall specify the time, place
and manner of making the discovery and inspection permitted and may
prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(e) Protective Orders. Upon a sufficient showing the court may at
any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or
deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by
the government the court may permit the government to make such
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the court in camera. If the court enters an order granting
relief following a showing in camera, the entire text of the government's
statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be
made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal by the
defendant.
(f) Time of Motions. A motion under this rule may be made only
within 10 days after arraignment or at such reasonable later time as the
court may permit. The motion shall include all relief sought under this
rule. A subsequent motion may be made only upon a showing of cause
why such motion would be in the interest of justice.
(g) Continuing Duty to Disclose; Failure to Comply. If, subsequent
to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this rule, and prior to or
during trial, a party discovers additional material previously requested
or ordered which is subject to discovery or inspection under the rule,
he shall promptly notify the other party or his attorney or the court of
the existence of the additional material. If at any time during the course
of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party
has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to
this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or in-
spection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not dis-
closed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the cir-
cumstances.
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